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Preface 
 
This Life Cycle Management Plan was developed with an explicit goal to serve as an 
example for those vendors who want to produce high-assurance products. Therefore, 
there is short commentary and explanations sprinkled throughout the document, when 
such additions may not normally be seen in such a plan. 
1 Introduction 
1.1 Purpose 
This document describes the Life Cycle Management Plan for the development of a high 
assurance secure product. A high assurance product is one for which its users have a high 
level of confidence that its security policies will be enforced continuously and correctly. 
Such products are constructed so that they can be analyzed for these characteristics. 
Lifecycle activities ensure that the product reflects the intent to ensure that the product is 
trustworthy and that vigorous efforts have been made to ensure the absence of 
unspecified functionality, whether accidental or intentional. 
 
The overall purpose and guiding principle for this document is to provide a methodology 
that will result in the creation of a product that will have a high level of assurance.  
 
This document was originally written in support of the Trusted Computing Exemplar 
(TCX) project. The TCX was a research project with a goal to document how a high 
assurance product can be made and distributed in a way that is compliant with the highest 
level of assurance possible, as measured by the Common Criteria (CC). [1] This highest 
level is referred to as evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL7). It is important to note that if 
an organization desires to produce a high assurance product it is not necessary to go 
through the official CC evaluation process to verify compliance with the CC; an 
organization may choose to only use the CC as an internal guide to reach an internal goal. 
This document was written with CC version 2.2 as its reference, which has been 
superseded by other versions; it will require additional effort to be compliant with the 
latest CC requirements to ensure that no newer requirements are missed or to tailor it to 
an alternative assurance standard. 
 
This document is the overarching high-level document that guides a product throughout 
its life cycle, from its initial conception to its eventual retirement, by defining policy, 
process, and high-level procedures. This dependency is illustrated in Figure 1 by showing 
how all other documents are influenced by this document. 
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Figure 1    Influence of Life Cycle Management Plan on Other Documentation 
Lower-level details, policies and requirements are spelled out in these and other 
documents. In addition to an overall influence on all documentation, the Life Cycle 
Management Plan influences all major activities, as illustrated in Figure 2. 
 
 
Figure 2    Influence of Life Cycle Management Plan on All Activities 
The successful CC evaluation of a product requires management and staff to be familiar 
with the CC requirements. The purpose of this document is to state high-level 
requirements at logical points in the life cycle of a product, not to repeat all the detailed 
EAL7 requirements in a logical chronological order. The actual complete fulfillment of 
the EAL7 requirements will have to be undertaken by the assigned parties of a task. For 
example, this document states that an Architectural Description shall be provided, but the 
required contents of the Architectural Description are listed in the CC or a CC-mandated 
requirements document called the protection profile (PP). 
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1.2 The Role of the Project manager and the CCB 
The Project Manager is the person who oversees the proper development of a product, 
using the Life Cycle Management Plan as guidance for building a product that meets the 
organization's standards of quality, timeliness of delivery, high assurance, etc. The 
Project Manager approves all efforts related to a product. 
 
The Change Control Board (CCB) is a per-product committee that is responsible for 
enforcing organization-wide policies and standards for the design, implementation, 
maintenance, and retirement of the product it oversees. One of the first actions of a CCB 
is the approval of a Life Cycle Management Plan, (i.e., this document). The CCB is 
required to review and approve all related product submissions into the official 
Configuration Management (CM) system, e.g., documentation, source code, 
specifications, etc. 
1.3 Formal Specifications 
The EAL7 criteria specify that two design documents be described formally: the 
Functional Specification, and the High-Level Design. In addition, the Low-Level Design 
must be specified in a semiformal fashion. This document assumes that these three 
specifications will first be written in an informal style that is suitable for software 
engineers to understand. Another activity will then be engaged to represent them in the 
style required by the CC. 
Common Criteria Definitions of Formality 
• Informal 
“An informal specification is written as prose in natural language...(e.g., Dutch, 
English, French, German). An informal specification is not subject to any notational 
or special restrictions other than those required as ordinary conventions for that 
language (e.g., grammar and syntax).” [2] 
• Semiformal 
“A semiformal specification is written in a restricted syntax language and is 
typically accompanied by supporting explanatory (informal) prose. The restricted 
syntax language may be a natural language with restricted sentence structure and 
keywords with special meaning, or it may be diagrammatic (e.g., data-flow 
diagrams, state transition diagrams, entity-relationship diagrams, data structure 
diagrams, and process or program structure diagrams). Whether based on diagrams 
or natural language, a set of conventions must be supplied to define the restrictions 
placed on the syntax.” [3] 
• Formal 
“A formal specification is written in a notation based upon well-established 
mathematical concepts, and is typically accompanied by supporting explanatory 
(informal) prose.” [4] 
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2 Life Cycle Phases and Activities 
Table 1 shows the phases of a product, and the activities that are performed in each 
phase. One of the purposes of this document is to specify what is done in each activity 
and when an activity can be considered complete. The activities in the following table are 
described in more detail in the remainder of this document. 
 
Table 1    Life Cycle Phases and Activities 
Phases Activities 
Conceive Product Definition 
Requirements Definition 
Design Product Design 
Detailed Design 
Build Implementation 
Testing and Composition 




The scope of this Life Cycle Management Plan does not include the following: 
• Project Management 
This document does not set policy or procedure with respect to activities such as 
project estimation, resource allocation, training, etc. 
• User Installation and Operation 
This document does not include procedures for a user to install the completed and 
packaged product. 
3 Overview of the Spiral Life Cycle Model 
A life cycle model is an abstraction for how an organization builds products. The model 
can by used as a management tool to ensure the right activities occur consistently in the 
right order. A methodology is then built around 
the model to show the processes used to 
complete each part of the building process. If 
followed, necessary activities are not only done, 
and done in the right order, they are done with 
completeness, and with evidence of compliance. 
By using the Spiral Life Cycle Model (hereafter 
referred to as just the “Spiral Model”) in 
conjunction with this Life Cycle Management 
Plan, high assurance products are created. 
 
The Spiral Model was selected for the TCX 
project because it is well known and understood, 
and considered one of the current “best 
practices” in engineering [5]. In addition, the 
Life Cycle Model 
 
Large projects can be difficult to manage. 
A recognized way of managing the 
complexity of a large project, and to 
increase the likelihood of its quality, is to 
abstract the process into something easier 
to mentally grasp. The Life Cycle Model 
is such an abstraction. Therefore, when 
such models are described they typically 
have visually meaningful names, such as 
“Waterfall” and “Spiral”. 
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Spiral Model works well within an academic environment where students may enter a 
project at any point and refine some aspect of a design or implementation. Not all of the 
life cycle activities are represented in the model, which is shown in Figure 3. 
 
 
Figure 3    Life Cycle Context of the Spiral Model 
The life cycle activities introduced in the previous section appear to be harshly serial, 
such that an activity cannot be started before the previous one is completed, which 
sounds like the traditional Waterfall model. The difference between the Spiral Model and 
the Waterfall Model is that the former allows the cycle to be completed without a 
deliverable product, with the understanding that iterating through the activities some 
number of times will eventually lead to a deliverable product. In other words, the Spiral 
Model allows a prototype to be developed with a compressed schedule in each activity, to 
allow the intermediate results to be examined before deciding whether to continue with 
the project. It is essentially a risk-reduction model, allowing potential design and 
implementation problems to be discovered early in the project. 
 
The model can be viewed from a high level as shown in Figure 4, with the spiral starting 
at the inside and gradually moving outward. 
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Figure 4    Simple View of the Spiral Model 
The spiral intersects a plane with four quadrants, as shown above. This model can now be 
filled in to show the activities that are performed in each quadrant, as shown in Figure 5. 
 
 
Figure 5    Detailed View of the Spiral Model [6] 
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The Spiral Model is very flexible and, as the outermost spiral shows, it is possible to 
“collapse” it into the traditional waterfall model if only one iteration produces a finished 
product. Such a situation may develop if the project is well understood and/or small 
enough to have little risk. The sections that follow describe the phases and activities in 
more detail. 
4 Conceive Phase 
4.1 Product Definition 
Inputs: A product idea, Evaluation Assurance Level 7 (EAL7). 
 
Outputs: Product Definition, Product Identifier, Life Cycle Management Plan, 
Configuration Management Plan, Configuration Management Procedures, Change 
Control Board (CCB), Configuration Management (CM) System, Configuration Items 
(CI) List, Personnel Security Plan, Physical Security Plan, Development Standards. 
 
The development of a product idea occurs over time. Whether the idea is formed by 
engineering staff or conceptualized by upper management is not important. However, at 
some point management must be involved to approve a new product idea and define its 
scope, resulting in a high-level description of what the potential product is going to be 
and what it is going to do. This description becomes the Product Definition. The targeted 
Evaluation Assurance Level (EAL) must be identified from the outset of the project 
because it affects the management of the product from the very beginning. This plan 
targets EAL7. 
 
After the product idea is well defined and management commits resources to the project, 
a Configuration Management (CM) system must be established if one does not already 
exist. A unique project identifier is then defined and registered with Configuration 
Management, and a Change Control Board (CCB) is formed. 
 
At a minimum, the following documentation must be produced and subsequently 
approved by the CCB before this phase can be considered finished: 
• Life Cycle Management Plan 
• Configuration Management Plan 
• Configuration Management Procedures 
• Configuration Items (CI) List 
• Personnel Security Plan 
• Physical Security Plan 
• Development Standards 
 
These documents are placed under CM, either as one “documentation” Configuration 
Item (CI) or as individual CI's, as seen fit by the Project Manager. Other documentation 
will be required as the project progresses. All of this documentation falls under the CM 
umbrella, and therefore each document must be assigned to an appropriate CI and 
approved by the CCB. 
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The Project Manager must decide how to proceed through the Spiral Model. The answers 
to the following questions will help form the direction the project takes: Is the problem 
small and well defined to try to get a product completed in one iteration of the model? Is 
some level of prototyping required before any major design decisions can be made? What 
activities will be skipped (if any)? After all the outputs of this activity have been finished, 
the Product Definition activity is exited and the Requirements Definition activity is 
entered. The Product Definition activity may not be considered complete because it may 
be revisited if the model starts another iteration. 
4.2 Requirements Definition 
Inputs: Product Definition. 
 
Outputs: Requirements Definition, Acceptance Plan, Acceptance Tests, (maybe a) 
Protection Profile (PP), Security Target (ST). 
 
This Requirements Definition activity separates itself from the Product Definition activity 
by clearly stating the minimal requirements that the product must meet to be acceptable. 
Such requirements may include performance standards, interface requirements, functional 
capabilities, security attributes, etc. A product cannot be designed without sufficient 
detail about what it is supposed to do. If there is some doubt about some aspects of the 
product, some amount of prototyping, simulation, modeling (or some other tool) can help 
to solidify the requirements. It may take one or two iterations of the spiral before the 
product requirements can be confidently completed. Among other things, the 
Requirements Definition articulates the TOE Security Policy (TSP). 
 
A major decision that must be made when considering the requirements is the targeted 
Protection Profile (PP), which will determine many of the product requirements, and how 
it will be developed. The number of evaluated PP's is fairly small, and the targeted EAL 
may further reduce the selection pool. It is possible that no suitable PP exists for the 
defined product and EAL, but that does not stop the product from continuing forward, 
though it may add additional time to the length of the evaluation process. 
 
After the PP has been selected, then the ST shall be written, which describes how the 
product shall meet the security requirements specified in the PP. The ST shall be written 
even if there is no suitable PP for the defined product. It should be emphasized that the 
PP and ST only describe the security requirements of the product, and therefore only 
represent a subset of the overall Requirements Definition. A complete Requirements 
Definition shall also contain all the non-security requirements of the product. 
 
With the Requirements Definition completed, an Acceptance Plan can be started. The 
purpose of the Acceptance Plan is to provide the strategy for testing a product before it is 
considered ready for delivery. The Acceptance Plan uses the Requirements Definition as 
its input. The Acceptance Tests are the tests, procedures, check-lists, etc., that implement 
the Acceptance Plan. 
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5 Design Phase 
5.1 Product Design 
Inputs: Requirements Definition. 
 
Outputs: Formal TSP Model, Functional Specification, Formal Functional Specification, 
Architectural Design, Product Test Plan, Product Tests. 
 
The informal TOE Security Policy (TSP), as contained in the Requirements Definition, 
must be translated into a formal representation known as the Formal TSP Model and 
supported by a formal proof. 
 
Using the Requirements Definition as input, the capabilities and external interfaces of the 
product are designed and specified in a document referred to as the Functional 
Specification. The Functional Specification must show that the design will satisfy the 
requirements set forth in the Requirements Definition. The Functional Specification is 
also expressed “in a formal style”. This Formal Functional Specification must include 
rationale that all TOE Security Functions (TSFs) are represented. The Functional 
Specification will include all functions (security and non-security-related), but the Formal 
Functional Specification will only include the security-related functions. This relationship 
is true for all specifications that require some level of formal work. A correspondence 
must then be proven formally between the Formal TOE Security Policy Model and the 
Formal Functional Specification. 
 
After the Functional Specification has been completed, an engineering team divides the 
product into a manageable number of subsystems, which are documented in the 
Architectural Design. Each subsystem must be described in sufficient detail concerning 
its function and how it interacts with the other subsystems. Breaking the system into 
many subsystems may make it easier to manage the product's complexity, but it increases 
the overhead of design because each subsystem must be separately designed, reviewed, 
approved, and managed. Therefore, a balance must be struck between subsystem 
granularity and product administration, which may be dependent on the skills of the 
managers and staff involved. It is also possible to take a subsystem, identify it as a 
separate product, and divide it into more subsystems. In addition to the software and 
hardware subsystems, the required documentation must also be identified, such as user 
manuals, programming manuals, system administration manuals, etc. The Architectural 
Design shall identify those CI's that shall be part of the evaluation and those CI's that 
shall be excluded from evaluation. Support tools, for example, might not be included if 
the PP does not specify their evaluation. The Project Manager shall determine to what 
degree the non-evaluated CI's shall adhere to the rigorous standards described in this 
document. 
 
After the Architectural Design is approved (which may take a couple of iterations 
through the spiral model), the designated subsystems are identified as Configuration 
Items (CI's). A change request is then submitted through the CCB to add these new CI's 
to the list of items managed under CM. 
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After the Functional Specification is completed, a Product Test Plan can be started. The 
Product Test Plan is the strategy for testing the completed product for compliance with 
the designed external product interfaces, as documented in the Functional Specification. 
The Product Tests are the tests, procedures, check-lists, etc., that implement the Product 
Test Plan. 
5.2 Detailed Design 
Each subsystem must be designed in greater detail. For each subsystem specified in the 
Architectural Design, a High-level Design is produced, followed by a Low-level Design. 
5.2.1 High-Level Design 
Inputs: Functional Specification, Architectural Design. 
 
Outputs: High-Level Design (per subsystem), Formal High-Level Design (per 
subsystem), Subsystem Test Plan (per subsystem), Subsystem Tests (per subsystem). 
 
The High-level Design describes the function and interface of the associated subsystem in 
detail, including all interfaces that are visible outside of the subsystem. 
 
The High-level Design must be translated into a formal representation, known as the 
Formal High-Level Design. The correspondence between the Formal High-Level Design 
and the Formal Functional Specification must be proven formally. 
 
After the High-level Design has been completed, the Subsystem Test Plan can be started. 
This test plan is the strategy for testing the external interfaces of the completed 
subsystem, as documented in the High-Level Design. The Subsystem tests are the tests, 
procedures, check-lists, etc., that implement the Subsystem Test Plan. 
5.2.2 Low-Level Design 
Inputs: High-Level Design. 
 
Outputs: Low-Level Design (per subsystem), Semiformal Low-Level Design (per 
subsystem), Internal Description, Unit Test Plan (per subsystem), Unit Tests (per 
subsystem), Covert Channel Analysis Plan, Covert Channel Analysis Tests. 
 
The Low-level Design is the lowest level of design prior to implementation activities. 
The specification provides a detailed design of the internals of the subsystem by breaking 
it down into modules. The modules are also grouped into layers with the upper layers 
dependent on lower layers, and lower layers independent of upper layers. In other words, 
there must be a loop-free design among the modules. Each module is then designed in 
detail. The Low-level Design is also expressed semiformally. The correspondence 
between the Semiformal Low-Level Design and the Formal High-Level Design must be 
demonstrated semiformally. 
 
The Internal Description is developed in cooperation with the Low-Level Design of each 
subsystem. It provides the overall module layering design for the TOE Security Functions 
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(TSF) across all subsystems, and explains how the internal design of the TSF meets the 
modularity, layering and minimization requirements of the CC. 
 
After the Low-level Design has been 
completed, a Unit Test Plan can be 
developed and finalized. The Unit Test 
Plan is the strategy for testing each 
module. The Unit Tests implement the 
Unit Test Plan. The CC also requires 
“Implementation Tests” that use the 
source code as the specification for 
writing another layer of tests. If the 
Low-Level design is not heavily 
detailed, then a separate 
Implementation Test Plan and 
Implementation Tests shall be 
developed in the Build Phase. 
However, if the Low-Level design is 
sufficiently detailed, then it is 
acceptable to review the 
implementation in the Build Phase and 
add only those tests (to the Unit Test 
Plan and Unit Tests) that are deemed 
necessary to satisfy Implementation 
Test requirements, based on a metric to 
be determined. 
 
Lastly, with the Low-level Design in place, the Covert Channel Analysis Plan can be 
written. This is the strategy for conducting the systematic Covert Channel Analysis. The 
Covert Channel Analysis Tests implement this plan. 
6 Build Phase 
6.1 Implementation 
Inputs: Low-Level Design, Schematic (for Hardware), Unit Tests. 
 
Outputs: Source code (for Software), Electronic components (for Hardware), Flaw 
Tracking and Remediation System, Flaw Tracking and Remediation Plan, Flaw Tracking 
and Remediation Procedures, (conditional) Implementation Test Plan (per subsystem), 
(conditional) Implementation Tests (per subsystem), Unit Test Results, Administrator 
Guidance, User Guidance. 
 
If it has not been established yet, the first thing that must be done in this activity is to 
provide a system and procedures for reporting, receiving and tracking problem reports 
Covert Channel Analysis 
 
Covert Channel Analysis is an analysis of the 
design and implementation of a product to 
find implicit, unintended avenues of 
information flow that are contrary to the 
enforced policies, and to “estimate their 
capacity”. At EAL7, the search for covert 
channels must be “systematic” [1] The search 
for existing covert channels is done through a 
variety of ways, such as an analysis of the 
functional interface for interaction between 
the function's effects on metadata and 
exceptions returned. If a covert channel is 
found, then the PP, ST or Project Manager 
may impose additional requirements. 
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(e.g., software bugs) related to the product. This documentation is referred to as the Flaw 
Tracking and Remediation Plan, and the Flaw Tracking and Remediation Procedures. 
 
The product is then built according to the specifications given in the Low-Level Design, 
adhering to the organization's development standards. The process from Product 
Definition to Code is shown in Figure 6, highlighting that there are separate High-Level 
Designs and Low-Level Designs for each subsystem. 
 
 
Figure 6    From Design to Code 
Modules are implemented from “the bottom up”, meaning that the independent modules 
are implemented first. After each module is implemented, it must undergo unit testing. 
These bottom-layer modules then form the foundation for implementing modules in the 
next layer up. These modules then undergo unit testing before continuing to the next 
layer. And so it continues until all the modules have been implemented and unit tested. 
 
A completed hardware component must also undergo unit testing to show that it performs 
as specified. 
 
As described in Section 5.2.2, a decision is made by the Program Manager (or delegated 
to the CCB), concerning whether the detail of the Low-Level Design is sufficient to 
obviate the need for separate Implementation Test Plans and Implementation Tests. If the 
design documents are sufficiently detailed, then the implementation is reviewed to 
consider which tests, if any, need to be added to the Unit Test Plans and Unit Tests in this 
activity. If the design documents are not sufficiently detailed, then separate 
Implementation Test Plans and Implementation Tests need to be developed in this 
activity, using the implementation as the specification to be tested. 
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The following documentation must be written before this activity is considered complete, 
though it could have been started in an earlier activity: 
• Administrator Guidance (for the customer) 
• User Guidance (for the customer) 
6.2 Testing and Composition 
Inputs: Implemented Subsystems, Subsystem Tests, Product Tests, Acceptance Tests, 
Flaw Tracking and Remediation System, Covert Channel Analysis Tests, Semiformal 
Low-Level Design, User Guidance, Administrator Guidance. 
 
Outputs: Validated Product, Covert Channel Analysis Report, Representation 
Correspondence, Implementation Correspondence, Vulnerability Analysis, Flaw Reports, 
Subsystem and Product Test Results, Testing Analysis, Guidance Documentation 
Analysis. 
 
As described in Section 6.1, a lot of testing is performed when code is being produced, 
i.e., unit testing. This section describes the testing process that must occur beyond the 
per-module testing. As Figure 7 shows, testing occurs at every stage to ensure that the 
pieces being composed are functioning according to specification before they are used. 
 
 
Figure 7    Relationship of Specifications, Components and Testing 
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After all the modules of a subsystem have been completely implemented and unit tested, 
the subsystem must be tested according to the Subsystem Test Plan. A subsystem can be 
baselined after the following have been done: 
• It has passed all its Subsystem tests. 
• It has undergone appropriate review. 
• It has been approved by the CCB. 
 
After all the subsystems have passed their tests, 
they are composed into a working version of the 
product. The Product Tests are applied against 
this composition. 
 
The testing that has occurred up to this point is 
functional in nature, viz., it is ensuring that the 
components perform as specified. The last testing 
step is to validate that the finished product meets 
the requirements specified in the Product 
Definition by performing the Acceptance Tests. 
 
In addition to the testing performed as described 
above, the source code is shown to be a true 
implementation of the security policy by showing 
a correspondence between the adjacent pairs of 
specifications. The resulting effort is recorded in a 
document known as the Representation 
Correspondence. This correspondence effort is 
shown between the informal specifications down 
to the source code, and between the formal 
specifications down to the source code. In 
addition to this pair-wise correspondence, the TSF 
must be shown to have a “direct correspondence” 
with the code, the result of which is known as the 
Implementation Correspondence. A less rigorous 
requirement for these correspondence efforts may 
be specified for a particular EAL or by the target 
PP. 
 
The Covert Channel Analysis Tests must be performed on the product to identify and 
measure all covert channels. This effort concludes with a written document known as the 
Covert Channel Analysis Report. 
 
Another activity that must be performed on the product is a vulnerability analysis. This 
analysis takes the flaws found during testing (and other means), and ensures that the 
flaws cannot be used to violate the enforced security policies in some way. The outcome 




It is possible for a subsystem to be 
completely implemented before the 
subsystems it depends on are 
implemented. In this situation, a 
subsystem can be tested, as long as 
the subsystems it depends on are 
emulated in some kind of “test 
harness” with sufficient expected 
behavior of the unfinished 
subsystems. It is then possible to have 
a subsystem implemented, tested and 
baselined before these supporting 
subsystems are implemented. 
However, there must be a balance 
struck between the time and effort to 
implement such a test harness, and 
the time it will take to wait for the 
supporting subsystems to be 
completed, and the risk that the test 
harness will not be a true 
representation of the eventual 
behavior of the baselined supporting 
subsystems, which would necessitate 
a repetition of the subsystem tests. 
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An analysis must be performed on the Administrator and User Guidance documents and 
documented in the Guidance Documentation Analysis. This analysis must be performed 
by someone other than the author(s) of the documents. “The objective is to ensure that 
misleading, unreasonable and conflicting guidance is absent from the guidance 
documentation...” [7] 
 
In conclusion, after all tests have been performed, an analysis must be made to show that 
the testing included sufficient depth and breadth. The outcome of this activity is recorded 
in a document known as the Testing Analysis. 
6.3 Packaging and Delivery 
Inputs: Product Definition, Requirements Definition, Functional Specification. 
 
Outputs: Integration Procedures, Delivery Procedures, Installation Procedures, 
Completed Product. 
 
The Integration activity determines 
how to securely package and deliver 
the baselined product to the user. 
Some aspects of how this will be 
done must be considered early in the 
design process in order to comply 
with CC requirements, such as 
Delivery and Operation (ADO). This planning is documented in the Integration 
Procedures and Delivery Procedures. A product cannot be delivered to a customer until it 
has been baselined and approved for release by the CCB.  
 
Another document, known as the Installation Procedures, must be written for the end-user 
to provide the procedures for a secure installation of the product. 
Baselined Product 
 
A product is considered baselined when all its 
Configuration Items (CIs), as defined in its 
Configuration Items List, have been baselined. 
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7 Modify Phase / Maintenance Activity 
Inputs: Completed Product, Flaw Tracking and Remediation System. 
 
Outputs: Revised Completed Product, Assurance Maintenance Plan, TOE Component 
Categorization Report, Evidence of Assurance Maintenance, Security Impact Analysis. 
 
Integration vs. Delivery vs. Installation 
 
The CC requires Integration procedures [8], Delivery procedures [9], and Installation 
procedures [10]. These procedures have some overlap, as shown in Figure 8. 
 
 
Figure 8    Overlap of Delivery Procedures 
 
 
Integration procedures describe how the individual baselined items are properly 
obtained from the CM system during the manufacturing process, and how the product 
is built and packaged for a customer. The Delivery procedures describe how the 
product is built so that it maintains its integrity, and how the customer can verify that 
the product received is what was sent. The installation procedures provide the steps 
the customer must take to securely install and configure the product. It is acceptable to 
split the Delivery procedures into its manufacturing and customer parts, and merge 
those parts into the appropriate Integration and Installation procedures, resulting in 
only two physical documents. 
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This phase is officially entered immediately after a product has been completed and 
baselined, in order to ensure that the product maintains its level of assurance between the 
time of its initial completion and the release of the next version. It is therefore advisable 
to start writing the Assurance Maintenance Plan before the completion of a product so the 
plan can be completed and baselined soon afterwards. 
 
At some point a product may 
need additional functionality 
and/or have a need to fix 
identified problems. Either 
effort requires approval from 
management to expend 
resources. Abstractly, such 
work can be viewed as another 
iteration of the Spiral Model. 
With respect to this Life Cycle 
Management Plan, the effort 
begins with the Product 
Definition activity. However, 
because documentation already 
exists for the product, it is a 
matter of updating the 
documentation to reflect new 
and/or modified functionality. 
 
All proposed changes to 
baselined items must first be 
reviewed and approved by the Project Manager before effort is expended. All proposed 
changes must clearly state the reason for the change, the affected CI's, and the proposed 
product version to receive the changes. As bugs are fixed, the bug-tracking system must 
be updated to reflect what was modified to correct the behavior, when it was changed, 
who changed it, and the expected version of the product to receive the change. 
Consideration should be given to notifying existing customers, especially if there is a 
change to the product's external interface. 
 
The following documentation must also be provided for the re-evaluation of the product: 
• TOE Component Categorization Report 
Each component of the TOE is categorized “according to its relevance to 
security”. The intent is that it will provide useful input for the Security Impact 
Analysis. 
• Security Impact Analysis 
This document provides a review of the changes made to the evaluated TOE (as 
well as the development process) and discusses the impact of those changes on 
the security and assurance of the new release. 
• Evidence of Assurance Maintenance 
Assurance Maintenance Plan 
 
The CC requires an Assurance Maintenance (AM) 
Plan to describe “...the plans and procedures a 
developer must implement in order to ensure that the 
assurance that was established in the certified TOE 
is maintained as changes are made to the TOE or its 
environment.” [11] It is technically not a required 
document for the initial evaluated product, but 
evaluators want to review it with the initial 
evaluation. This is to avoid a situation where a 
subsequent evaluation is denied because the 
handling of the baselined product, or the handling of 
the development environment, tainted the confidence 
in the product. Because of the kind of information 
required in an AM Plan, it cannot be completely 
finished until all the CI's of a product release have 
been baselined. 
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For the most part, this document provides proof that the Assurance Maintenance 
Plan was followed during the maintenance activity. 
8 Retire Phase / Retirement Activity 
Inputs: Completed Product. 
 
Outputs: Retirement Announcement. 
 
After it has been fielded, management can decide that resources should no longer be 
expended on the support of a product (or version of a product). The minimal steps taken 
when such a decision is made are: 
• Set a date 
Set a date for the termination of product support. This date should be far enough 
in the future that users of the product have time to consider their options. 
• Notify users 
Send a Retirement Announcement to all known internal and external users of the 
product, or other means to communicate the termination of the product to the 
appropriate users. 
9 Other Policies 
If violations of the policies set forth in this document are found (e.g., unit testing was not 
performed on a baselined module), then an audit must take place to determine how it was 
allowed to happen, and whether the problem has a larger scope (e.g., no unit testing was 
done on all modules submitted by a particular person or group). In military terminology, 
a “stand down” must take place, overseen by the CCB, until the process can be put back 
into place. A review must then take place to consider how the problem can be avoided in 
the future. 
 
All reviews, approvals and audits must have a “paper trail” to provide evidence that the 
required steps were performed, and to provide the necessary accountability for who 
approved and performed the work. 
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Appendix A – Time Lines 
Figure 9 is a representation of the dependencies on the various deliverables described in 




Figure 9    Time Line Dependencies 
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Appendix B – Overview of Documentation Generated 
This appendix lists all the documentation generated by following the process described in 
this document. It is possible that in reality one physical document contains all the 
information required in more than one document listed below. The two tables provide the 
same information, with Table 2 sorted by Activity, and Table 3 sorted by document title. 
 
Table 2    Documentation Required (Sorted by Time) 
Document Activity that Generates 
the Document 
Product Definition Product Definition 
Configuration Management Plan Product Definition 
Configuration Management Procedures Product Definition 
Configuration Items List Product Definition 
Personnel Security Plan Product Definition 
Physical Security Plan Product Definition 
Development Standards Product Definition 
Project Plan Product Definition 
Requirements Definition Requirements Definition 
Acceptance Plan / Acceptance Tests Requirements Definition 
Protection Profile (may not be selected nor produced) Requirements Definition 
Security Target Requirements Definition 
Formal TSP Model Product Design 
Functional Specification Product Design 
Formal Functional Specification Product Design 
Product Test Plan / Product Tests Product Design 
Architectural Design Product Design 
High-Level Design Detailed Design 
Formal High-Level Design Detailed Design 
Subsystem Test Plan / Subsystem Tests Detailed Design 
Low-Level Design Detailed Design 
Formal Low-Level Design Detailed Design 
Internal Description Detailed Design 
Unit Test Plan / Unit Tests Detailed Design 
Covert Channel Analysis Plan Detailed Design 
Source Code Implementation 
Implementation Test Plan / Implementation Tests 
(Conditional) 
Implementation 
Flaw Tracking and Remediation Plan Implementation 
Flaw Tracking and Remediation Procedures Implementation 
Unit Test Results Implementation 
Administrator Guidance Implementation 
User Guidance Implementation 
Covert Channel Analysis Testing and Composition 
Representation Correspondence Testing and Composition 
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Document Activity that Generates 
the Document 
Implementation Correspondence Testing and Composition 
Vulnerability Analysis Testing and Composition 
Subsystem and Product Test Results Testing and Composition 
Guidance Documentation Analysis Testing and Composition 
Testing Analysis Testing and Composition 
Delivery Procedures Packaging and Delivery 
Installation Procedures Packaging and Delivery 
Integration Procedures Packaging and Delivery 
Assurance Maintenance Plan Maintenance 
TOE Component Categorization Report Maintenance 
Evidence of Assurance Maintenance Maintenance 
Security Impact Analysis Maintenance 
Retirement Announcement Retirement 
 
 
Table 3    Documentation Required (Sorted by Document Title) 
Document Activity that Generates 
the Document 
Acceptance Plan / Acceptance Tests Requirements Definition 
Administrator Guidance Implementation 
Architectural Design Product Design 
Assurance Maintenance Plan Maintenance 
Configuration Items List Product Definition 
Configuration Management Plan Product Definition 
Configuration Management Procedures Product Definition 
Covert Channel Analysis Testing and Composition 
Covert Channel Analysis Plan Detailed Design 
Delivery Procedures Integration 
Development Standards Product Definition 
Evidence of Assurance Maintenance Maintenance 
Flaw Tracking and Remediation Plan Implementation 
Flaw Tracking and Remediation Procedures Implementation 
Formal High-Level Design Detailed Design 
Formal Low-Level Design Detailed Design 
Formal Functional Specification Product Design 
Formal TSP Model Product Design 
Functional Specification Product Design 
Guidance Documentation Analysis Testing and Composition 
High-Level Design Detailed Design 
Implementation Correspondence Testing and Composition 
Implementation Test Plan / Implementation Tests 
(Conditional) 
Implementation 
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Document Activity that Generates 
the Document 
Installation Procedures Packaging and Delivery 
Integration Procedures Implementation 
Internal Description Detailed Design 
Low-Level Design Detailed Design 
Personnel Security Plan Product Definition 
Physical Security Plan Product Definition 
Product Definition Product Definition 
Product Test Plan / Product Tests Product Design 
Project Plan Product Definition 
Protection Profile (may not be selected nor produced) Requirements Definition 
Representation Correspondence Testing and Composition 
Requirements Definition Requirements Definition 
Retirement Announcement Retirement 
Security Impact Analysis Maintenance 
Security Target Requirements Definition 
Source Code Implementation 
Subsystem and Product Test Results Testing and Composition 
Subsystem Test Plan / Subsystem Tests Detailed Design 
Testing Analysis Testing and Composition 
TOE Component Categorization Report Maintenance 
Unit Test Plan / Unit Tests Detailed Design 
Unit Test Results Implementation 
User Guidance Implementation 
Vulnerability Analysis Testing and Composition 
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